Introduction
The ultimate goal of a bankruptcy system is to sort viable and unviable distressed firms. Asymmetric information however prevents an errorless bankruptcy system. Type I errors occur when unviable firms are saved under court-supervised reorganization. Type II-errors occur if viable firms are shut down instead of reorganized under court-supervised reorganization (White, 1994) . Many studies show that firms exiting Chapter 11 are liquidated during the post-bankruptcy period (see e.g. Hotchkiss, 1995 , Bris et al., 2006 Morrison, 2007) . This strongly suggests that type I errors are only revealed in the post-confirmation stage.
Using a sample of small distressed firms, we analyze failure or bankruptcy-liquidation of distressed firms during the post-confirmation stage. Unlike Chapter 11 in the U.S., the Belgian reorganization legislation temporary imposes court-supervision after plan confirmation 1 . The court-supervised postconfirmation stage takes maximum 24 months with an optional prolongation of at most 12 months. In most cases, the court-supervised post-confirmation period is simply fixed at 24 months. This courtsupervised period can lead to the full execution of the plan or not. In the latter case, a creditor or the court-appointed examiner can file a request with the court to revoke the judicial composition and the post-confirmation stage. The debtor can do the same if it is clear that a full execution or any creditorapproved amendment of the plan is unfeasible. In case of revocation, the judge takes a decision to 'convert' to bankruptcy-liquidation after additional examination of the distressed firm's viability. If the judge revokes the court-supervised post-confirmation period without conversion, the case is actually 'dismissed' like in the pre-confirmation stage of Chapter 11.
Our analysis of failure is strictly limited to the court-supervised post-confirmation period. We analyze the likelihood of failure during this period, and the time spent under this court-supervised stage before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation. We specifically test whether unviable firms are liquidated as fast as possible. The delay in the shutdown decision produces direct administrative costs and indirect resource allocation costs. The longer an unviable firm lingers under court-supervision, the greater the delay in reallocating the distressed firm's assets to a third party who can put them to a better use. Many critics of the Chapter 11 reorganization process argue that unviable firms are not liquidated in a timely manner (see e.g. Franks & Torous, 1989; Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007; Denis & Rodgers, 2007) . Chang and Schoar (2006) show that judicial discretion affects company performance during the postconfirmation stage. Specifically some judges appear to rule persistently more favorably towards creditors (pro-creditor bias) and debtors (pro-debtor bias) 2 . They show that a pro-debtor judicial bias leads to increased rates of re-filing and firm shut-down as well as lower credit ratings and lower annual sales growth of firms that emerge from Chapter 11. In sum, a judge's discretionary actions during the pre-confirmation stage affect business continuation during the post-chapter 11 era. Chang and Schoar (2006) create an aggregate index to measure bias by 8 types of motions that are filed exclusively by the debtor or the creditors, e.g. the use of cash collateral and the lifting of the automatic stay. Unfortunately, we cannot follow their approach as specific and comparable Belgian rules do not exist, or are not formalized. We instead introduce proxies for judicial activity (passivity) during the pre-confirmation stage to investigate its impact on the likelihood of transfer to bankruptcyliquidation after plan confirmation. Our approach offers insight in another dimension of judicial behavior often implicitly refereed to in literature.
Theoretical models suggest that secured creditors may prefer liquidation to reorganization (see e.g. Bulow & Shoven, 1978; White, 1989; Kordana & Posner, 1999) . Bergström et al. (2002) e.g. find that well-secured creditors oppose plan confirmation under Finnish court-supervised reorganization. In our sample of confirmed plans it seems logical not to expect secured creditor resistance after plan confirmation, since secured creditors and debtors in principle reached a compromise on the loan conditions during pre-confirmation bargaining. This intuition might be very misleading. First, judges and unsecured creditors may confirm a plan without the individual consent of secured creditors, as is actually the case in both the U.S. and Belgium. Obviously, the conflict between secured creditors and debtors remains unsettled. Moreover, and unlike in the U.S., secured creditors always regain their liquidation rights 18 months after plan confirmation, if no agreement was reached during the preconfirmation stage. Therefore, if secured creditors are not fully repaid within those 18 months, they can freely seize and sell assets. This may lead well-secured creditors to induce bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. Next to secured debt, the debt composition of distressed firms mainly consists of unpaid government claims and trade credit. Those unsecured claims are examined and incorporated in the analysis.
Our paper contributes to the limited empirical evidence on court-supervised reorganization of small firms (see e.g. Campell, 1996; Sundgren, 1998; Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007; Fisher & Martel, 2004) . The total assets of our sample corporations do not exceed € 5.000.000. An additional sample of individuals seeking to preserve a sole proprietorship under the Belgian reorganization procedure is analyzed separately. Unlike in the U.S., individual debtors with a sole proprietorship cannot file a petition for a Chapter 13-like procedure in Belgium. Our research findings shed light on the identification process of type I errors after the pre-confirmation stage, on judicial discretion, and on the liquidation preference of secured banks during Belgian court-supervised reorganization.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the legal framework of the Belgian courtsupervised reorganization. Section 3 gives an overview of the literature and formulates the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and defines variables. Section 5 shows the main empirical results. Using hazard regression analysis, the length of time spent in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation is analyzed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Legal framework
An insolvent firm can either liquidate or reorganize. In Belgium, liquidation and reorganization are regulated by distinct legislations. The United States Bankruptcy Code makes an equivalent distinction between Chapter 7 (bankruptcy-liquidation) and Chapter 11 (bankruptcy-reorganization) within the same legislation. The Belgian reorganization legislation was enacted in 1997, with the objective to reduce the number of bankruptcies and to preserve firms with profitable operations by means of a process of court-supervised financial restructuring. This legislation is called the Law on Judicial Composition (hereafter LJC) and came into force on January 1st 1998. Figure 1 below illustrates the timing of the Belgian LJC in three stages. In the pre-bankruptcy period (stage I), the debtor decides to file for bankruptcy-reorganization or not. The debtor has to file with the court where the firm is registered and the register of the firm must by law be related to real activity, which largely excludes forum shopping in the Belgian context. The creditor cannot file a petition. The bankruptcy court makes an initial assessment on the viability of the distressed firm when a petition is filed. If the court accepts the petition, the debtor remains in possession and must draft and confirm a reorganization plan during a six-month exclusivity period. The court appoints an examiner who controls the debtor and assists him with drafting the plan 3 . This exclusivity period can be extended by maximum 3 months to deal with bargaining issues. In the U.S., Bris et al. (2006) refer to the bargaining period as the Chapter 11-phase 'from submission to plan confirmation'. We define stage II of the Belgian bankruptcy system as the pre-confirmation stage consisting of both phases 'from filing to plan' and 'from submission to plan confirmation'. Like in the U.S., secured creditors are subject to an automatic stay during the pre-confirmation stage.
Like in the U.S., the distressed firms can be subject to case dismissal or conversion to bankruptcyliquidation during the pre-confirmation stage. The court can only decide to dismiss a case upon request of the appointed examiner or the debtor and on the ground that the firm is no longer viable or no longer distressed to justify the stay of the creditors 4 . In principle, a court that dismisses the case on the ground of inviability and the impossibility to reorganize should convert the case immediately to bankruptcy-liquidation according to jurisprudence of the Belgian Supreme Court. 5 In practice, there are hardly any consequences for a judge that neglects this conversion rule 6 . This rule is thus frequently violated, for reasons discussed below (section 4.4), leaving the court with a margin of appreciation in case of dismissal.
At the end of stage II, a meeting of the unsecured creditors votes on the debtor-proposed reorganization plan. The unsecured creditors mainly consist of trade creditors and the social security administration. A reorganization plan is approved if (i) a majority of unsecured creditors present at the meeting vote in favor of the plan, and (ii) the value of the claims voting in favor of the plan represent at least 50% of the total value of claims of unsecured creditors present at the meeting. The debts of these creditors have to be, in principal, repaid during a maximum period of 24 months, i.e. the courtsupervised post-confirmation stage (see further on this stage -stage III).
Secured creditors do not vote collectively. Their individual approval is obliged when the debtor proposes an alteration to their legal entitlements. If the secured creditor and the debtor reach a new agreement on the loan repayments, the creditor cannot seize or sell assets during the post-confirmation stage as long as the debtor fully complies with this new contract. If on the other hand no agreement is reached between both parties, the Belgian legal framework provides the debtor with only one alternative, i.e. the deferral of the principal amount of the loan for a maximum of 18 months, on the condition that during this period interest is paid. As a consequence, the secured creditor will temporarily not be able to seize and sell the pledged assets, but regains his full liquidation rights after 18 months. More far-reaching legal measures comparable to the forced rescheduling of secured debt in accordance with § 1129 U.S. Bankruptcy Code are not available to Belgian debtors.
After the approval by the unsecured creditors and any arrangement with secured creditors (or forced deferral), the court confirms 7 the plan and the debtor is supposed to fully execute this plan. The plan execution takes place during a period of maximum 24 months under supervision of the judges and the appointed examiner. Our dataset clearly shows that the court-supervised period is fixed at 24 months for 98% of the cases. During this fixed period, the court and creditors can however decide to prolong the court-supervised period with a maximum of 12 months. In case of prolongation, a new plan needs to be established because the initial confirmed plan is only drafted for a period of 24 months. A prolongation of the court-supervised post-confirmation period does however not occur frequently. We refer to the period of maximum 24 months with optional prolongation of 12 months, as the courtsupervised post-confirmation stage (stage III).
The court-supervised post-confirmation stage can lead to the full execution of the plan or not. In the latter case, a creditor or the appointed examiner can file a request with the court to revoke the judicial composition and the post-confirmation stage. The debtor can do the same if it is clear that a full execution or any creditor-approved amendment of the plan is unfeasible. If the court grants the request for revocation, it can again opt for the conversion of the firm to bankruptcy-liquidation. 
Theory and hypotheses.
Several studies show that many firms are liquidated after leaving Chapter 11 (see e.g. Jensen-Conklin, 1992; Hotchkiss, 1995 , Bris et al., 2006 Morrison, 2007) . This suggests that some of the Type-I errors, where unviable firms are allowed to reorganize, are revealed in the post-confirmation period.
Firms in distress typically suffer from poor operating performance in combination with a suboptimal capital structure. In line with conventional theory, we expect that more distressed firms are more likely to fail during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage, while less distressed firms are more likely to survive. In our sample of firms with confirmed plans it seems logical not to expect creditor resistance in the post-confirmation period, since secured creditors and debtors have reached an agreement after renegotiating the loan conditions during the pre-confirmation bargaining. This may however be misguided for several reasons. Theoretical models suggest that secured creditors favor liquidation over reorganization (see White 1989; Bulow & Shoven, 1994 Recent empirical research documents large behavioral differences among judges in the U.S. (see T. Chang, A. Schoar, 2006; Bris, Welch and Zhu, 2007) 9 . Chang and Schoar show that a pro-debtor bias leads to increased rates of re-filing and firm shutdown as well as lower post-bankruptcy credit ratings and lower annual sales growth up to five years after the original bankruptcy filing. Judicial discretion clearly affects the company performance during the post-confirmation stage in their study. The Belgian bankruptcy legislation assigns an extensive screening task to the public actors during the preconfirmation stage. Upon examination of the firm's viability and rescue prospects, the judge can dismiss the judicial composition in three ways during the pre-confirmation stage. First, the judge can reject the petition for court-supervised reorganization filed by the debtor. Second, the judge can equally dismiss the judicial composition during the pre-confirmation stage upon request of the appointed examiner or the debtor. Third, if creditors accept the plan, the judge can ultimately refuse plan confirmation resulting in dismissal of the case. The appraisal of the firm's viability and its future prospects is at best a vague guideline for the judge and the appointed examiner, leaving them with substantial discretionary power. In case of dismissal, the court can furthermore convert the distressed firm to bankruptcy-liquidation, which again leaves margin for discretionary behaviour. We therefore expect that the likelihood of bankruptcy-liquidation during the post-confirmation stage depends on the discretionary behaviour of judges and their appointed examiners during the pre-confirmation stage. Formally, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Judicial discretion affects the likelihood bankruptcy-liquidation during the courtsupervised post-confirmation. 8 In an unreported analysis (available on request), we find that debt reduction on institutional debt (25% of the cases) occurs less frequently than the reduction of trade debt (70% of the cases). Moreover, the debt reductions are small and the reduced social contributions and tax claims are fully repaid within 24 months in 81% of the cases. This repayment of relatively sizeable government claims within 24 months might impose a severe burden on the cash flows. This finding is not unexpected. The Belgian bankruptcy-reorganization law (LJC) has provided the tax authorities with a strong position in the procedure, as they can veto any alteration of their legal entitlements. Furthermore, the social security administration frequently resists debt reduction, and takes this matter to court (in event to the Supreme Court) 9 See N. Gennaioli and S. Rossi (2007) for a theoretic model on judicial discretion. We test our hypotheses in a sample of small distressed firms that submitted a going concern plan. We exclude corporations with total assets exceeding € 5.000.000, which leaves a sample of 107 small corporations. We additionally exclude an incorporated football club and one liquidation scheme among the small corporations 11 . Sole proprietorships are small by definition. We remove four individual debtors with liquidation schemes. All those sample restrictions result in a sample of 105 small corporations and 61 sole proprietorships.
Data
For the corporations we complement our dataset of confirmed plans with financial statement data prior to petition-filing for bankruptcy-reorganization. There are no financial statement data for sole proprietorships because they are not obliged to publish accounting data. To ensure a sufficiently high quality of the financial statement data, we do not include corporations for which the time period between the financial statement date and the filing date for bankruptcy-reorganization is longer then 18 months. This removes another 14 corporations, resulting in a sample of 91 corporations.
Since the court jointly appraises the cases of closely related corporations, the data on the financial statements should in principle be aggregated. Simple data aggregation is however not recommended because of intra-group transactions and consolidated accounts are not available. Plans submitted by closely related corporations are therefore excluded from the sample of corporations resulting in final sample of 89 corporations 12 .
Sample firms.
The corporations differ by legal form. 45 corporations are non-quoted public limited liability corporations (Société Anonyme), 41 are private limited companies (Société Privée à Responsabilité Limitée), and 3 incorporated firms have another legal status. Table 1 gives summary statistics sorted by legal form. Like all debt variables in this paper (see further), total liabilities are measured at the initiation of the procedure, i.e. 6 to 9 months before plan confirmation. The public limited liability corporations are clearly larger than the private limited companies. The sole proprietorships are small (based on the comparison of the liabilities). . If firms survive the initial post-confirmation period of maximum 24 months, the debtor can request prolongation of maximum 12 months. In this case a new plan is established and confirmed because the initial confirmed plan is only drafted for a period of maximum 24 months. The court and the unsecured creditors need to confirm the prolongation and the modified plan. Panel B of table 2 shows that the court-supervision period is extended for 9 corporations and 7 sole proprietorships. The prolongation takes 12 months for respectively 9 corporations and 6 sole proprietorships, and 9 months for 1 sole proprietorship. Panel C shows that only 1 corporation ends in bankruptcy-liquidation during the prolonged court-supervised post-confirmation period. Type I errors are therefore limited during the prolongation. Panel D shows the time spent in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage before transfer to bankruptcyliquidation. The average time is 11 months for both corporations and sole proprietorships. The minimal length of time spent shows that some firms fail almost immediately after plan confirmation. Table 3 provides summary statistics on the number of confirmed plans and the number of failing firms during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage per bankruptcy court. Data are sorted by courts size in the respective subsamples. The sole proprietorships resorting under the court of Charleroi fail infrequently after plan confirmation (bold cases in table 3). Put differently, sole proprietorships with confirmed plans in Charleroi have a significant likelihood to survive after plan confirmation. We hypothesized that more distressed firms are more likely to end in bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation (hypothesis 1.a.). Table 4 shows summary statistics on distress for failing and non-failing firms.
Panel A reports accounting data for our sample of 89 small corporations. Our profitability variable is defined as gross operating income (EBITDA) before filing the petition scaled by total assets, which is typically used as accounting measure of post-bankruptcy performance (see e.g. Hotchkiss, 1995; Denis & Rodgers, 2007) . The reorganization plans show that distressed firms critically rely on their gross operating income for their installment payments during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. The leverage ratio is defined as total liabilities to total assets and the liquidity ratio as the quick ratio (current asset minus inventory to current liabilities). We find that the pre-bankruptcy profitability is significantly lower at the 5% level for firms ending in bankruptcy-liquidation than for non-failing firms, which does not allow us to reject hypothesis 1a. The pre-bankruptcy variables leverage and liquidity have no role to play.
Panel A of table 4 shows that failing incorporated firms have significantly more unpaid government debt and trade credit 14 outstanding at the 10% level. The finding on government debt is in line with hypothesis 2b. We also find that the share of secured bank debt in total debt is significantly larger for non-failed firms at the 5% level, which is seemingly in conflict with hypothesis 2.a. In this univariate analysis debt interactions are however neglected. Failing firms might have accumulated more unpaid government debt and trade credit during the pre-bankruptcy period, resulting in lower shares of secured bank debt in total debt for failed firms as compared to the non-failed firms. In the multivariate analysis in section 5, we will control for the complete debt composition. Alternatively, the liquidation effect of secured banks on the likelihood of bankruptcy-liquidation might be less pronounced in our sample of confirmed plans (see also section 5).
Panel B shows financial data reported in the confirmed plans of individual debtors attempting to reorganize their sole proprietorship. There are no significant differences between failed and non-failed sole proprietorships in terms of government debt, trade debt or secured bank debt. 
Bankruptcy courts and appointed examiners.
The screening behavior of public actors during the pre-confirmation stage affects the likelihood of failure during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage. We expect that active and intensive screening during the pre-confirmation period leads to lower failure rates in the post-confirmation stage. It is hard however to find appropriate measures for the screening behavior of the public actors. The power of the court to dismiss the case is conditional on a request thereto from another party and therefore reveals only partial information on the behavior of the court and the presiding judges. The same applies to actions from the appointed examiner since we can only observe the court files and not any underlying dynamics. A debtor's request for dismissal might be instigated by the appointed examiner or vice versa. 15 The judge, who has appointed the examiner, might instigate an appointed examiner's request for dismissal.
A less ambiguous parameter with regard to the screening behavior of the court is the court's response to a dismissal. Within the philosophy of the American Bankruptcy system, case dismissal may be justified for a variety of reasons such as the failure to file financial schedules, pay fees or hire an attorney, or the absence of assets available to unsecured creditors. Although most of the dismissed cases in the U.S. are liquidation (see Morrision, 2007) , dismissal is a logical part of the U.S. system. Case dismissal is however less justified in the Belgian framework. If Belgian judges dismiss a case of an unviable firm without resorting to conversion, they leave the bankruptcy-liquidation decision to the debtor or the creditor 16 . The frequency of case dismissals during the pre-confirmation stage, or alternatively the frequency of case conversions, might reveal an important dimension of actual screening behavior by the public actors during the pre-confirmation stage: Judges that systematically opt for dismissal instead of conversion can be labeled as passive, since they defer the filtering decision to other involved parties. . We calculate the Conversion rate during the pre-confirmation stage for each of the 17 bankruptcy courts involved in our sample study. The variable amounts to the fraction of conversions during the pre-confirmation stage scaled by the total number of bankruptcies (after conversion or dismissal) during the pre-confirmation stage 17 . A low rate of conversion indicates that the corresponding court has passive judges that leave the decision to transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation to the market. Panel A of table 5 gives summary statistics on this judicial activity variable for the five largest courts. The courts of Charleroi and Liège are clearly more active than other courts. This might explain the low number of distressed firms ending in bankruptcy-liquidation after plan confirmation for the sole proprietorships resorting under those courts (see table 3 ).
As already noted, judges can only decide to convert to bankruptcy-liquidation if examiners or debtors request to dismiss the court-supervised reorganization. The Conversion rate during the preconfirmation stage may therefore be driven by both judges and their appointed examiners (i.e. both public actors).
The educational background and the professional experience of the appointed examiner may therefore affect the screening process and indirectly the likelihood of bankruptcy-liquidation during the courtsupervised post-confirmation stage. Eisenberg and Tagashira (1994) analyze examiners' valuations of the liquidation value of business assets for a sample of Japanese firms under reorganization. They find that the valuations of lawyers and certified public accountants are not abnormal, while other examiners tend to overestimate the liquidation values. They however use one dummy variable to capture both certified public accountants and lawyer, which implies that that there still might be an unidentified difference between these two categories. We distinguish four classes of educational background for examiners: lawyers, auditors, accountants, and those with other (economic) backgrounds. Lawyers, auditors, and accountants are committed to their respective professional institutes. The other examiners are often bookkeepers, which are equally committed to their professional institute. Lawyers might be less experienced in identifying viable and unviable firms because they are not trained in business economics. We do not address the question whether an accountant has better reorganizing and filtering skills than other examiners with economic background, as both auditors and bookkeepers equally need to pass exams to exercise their tasks (including these tasks of an examiner).
Panel B shows that the educational background of the court-appointed examiners differs among courts. . One could argue that these examiners are appointed to liquidate the distressed firm and are therefore endogenous to the survival probabilities of the firm. This is however unlikely in our sample of going concern plans (liquidation schemes were excluded from the sample). Further inspection also reveals that the correlation between the number of appointments as liquidator and board member is negligible ( -0.0652) 20 , suggesting that professional liquidators are not present in our sample. 18 We only measure the number of auditor positions in personal capacity, and trivially only for auditors. 19 In our sample of small corporations with 89 appointed examiners, 36 and 14 of these examiners have no experience as liquidator (40%) and as a member of the board of directors of Belgian firms (16%). The average number of appointments is respectively 3.94 and 3.19 (medians are 1 and 2). 20 The correlation between the number of appointments as liquidator and board member is also around zero in our sample of sole proprietorships.
5.
The likelihood of failure: distress, debt composition and judicial discretion.
Corporations.
The failure of corporations during the post-confirmation period of the Belgian court-supervised restructuring may be driven by firm distress, debt composition and judicial discretion. We model the likelihood of failure as a Probit model. Results are shown in table 6. In specification 1 of table 6 we introduce financial variables from the last annual account prior to petition filing for bankruptcyreorganization as determinants of the likelihood of failure. Like in the univariate analysis, higher profitability (measured as EBITDA scaled by total assets) is related to lower failure rates, while leverage and liquidity do not seem to affect the likelihood of failure. In specification 2 we control for industry conditions by introducing the industry sales growth, the industry profit margin, and industry dummies 21 . The estimates of specification 1 are robust, and the variables Industry sales growth and Industry profit margin have the expected negative sign.
In specifications 3 and 4 we introduce debt composition measures in our specification. Specification 3 reveals that distressed firms with higher levels of government debt are indeed more likely to fail, which does not allow us to reject hypothesis 2.b. Specification 4 shows that firms with higher levels of secured bank debt are less likely to fail, which seems to contrast the proposition that secured creditors prefer liquidation over reorganization and hence with hypothesis 2.a. The simultaneous inclusion of Secured bank debt/total debt, Government debt/total debt and Trade credit/total debt in the estimation is troublesome because of multicollinearity concerns, since secured debt, government debt and trade credit account for the lion's share of debt for small distressed firms. In specification 5 we replace the denominator total debt by total assets and simultaneously include Secured bank debt/total assets, Government debt/total assets and Trade credit/total assets as independent variables. The leverage variable, which is very close to a linear combination of these three variables, is accordingly excluded from this and further specifications. Firms that are more reliant on government debt are robustly found more likely to fail, while the opposite is true, though not significantly, for secured bank debt.
The variable Secured bank debt/total assets could be interpreted as a loan to value ratio (LTV ratio), where total assets act as proxy for the value of assets. A higher value of the LTV ratio implies lower expected proceeds in case of liquidation; and this might lower the secured bank's incentive to liquidate. Total assets are however not the best measure of liquidation value. The bankruptcy literature usually employs more specific measures, e.g. Collateral value/secured debt (see Bergström et al., 2002; Franks & Sussman, 2005) . Bergström et al. (2002) argue that secured creditors may increasingly oppose a debtor's reorganization as the collateral value approaches the amount of their claims. If the reorganization succeeds, well-secured creditors receive only part of the appreciation of the firm's value, while they bear the brunt of the depreciation of the firm's value if the reorganization fails. Bergström et al. find accordingly that highly secured creditors oppose plan confirmation under Finnish 21 The variable Industry sales growth is the industry average of the annual sales growth over the last three fiscal years prior to petition filing (based on 3 digit-Nace codes). The Industry profit margin is the industry average of the operating profit margin for the last fiscal year prior to petition filing (equally based on 3 digit-Nace codes). Industry dummies are defined as follows: wholesale (23 cases), retail (15 cases), manufacturing (13 cases), hotels and restaurants (9 cases), construction (8 cases), other industries (21 cases). Other industries are omitted. . The two variables are set to zero for cases without bank debt (21 cases) and with unsecured bank debt (10 cases) 24 . In specification 6 and 7 we separately add the collateral variables to the list of independent variables. We find that both variables have the expected positive sign and that Collateral value/secured debt is significant at the 5% level in specification 7
25 . These findings suggest that secured banks do not support the reorganization if their collateral values are high.
In the specifications 8 to 11, we show that judicial discretion does not heavily affect the failure of distressed corporations during the post-confirmation period. In specification 8 we enrich specification 5 with court dummies for the three largest courts in our sample of corporations (the courts of Antwerp, Charleroi and Leuven) and find that they do not contribute to the explanation of failure. In specification 9 we introduce our court activity variable (the Conversion rate during the preconfirmation stage) which seems to play no role. In specification 10 we include our variables on examiner education and experience. We find that the likelihood of failure is lower if the appointed examiner is an auditor. This suggests that auditors are more effective screeners during the preconfirmation stage resulting in fewer bankruptcies during the post-confirmation stage 26 . The examiner experience variable is negative but insignificant. Specification 11 shows that cases with examiners with more Board experience have a lower likelihood to fail during the post-confirmation stage, although borderline not significantly, suggesting that these examiners may be more effective screeners during the pre-confirmation stage. In unreported regressions (available on demand), we find that the examiner's experience, as liquidator has no impact on the failure decision.
In the remaining specifications, we add four entrepreneurial-related variables to baseline specification 7. First, the variable Management experience is introduced in specification 12, which amounts to all positions on boards ever held (in the board of other Belgian firms) by members of the distressed firm's board. The average number of management positions is 4.04 (median is 2 -maximum is 27). Although 22 The estimation results are fairly robust if we do not use logarithmic transformations. 23 Two firms did not provide a security right with respect to their real estate. The value of land & buildings is revalued to zero by construction for those two cases. 24 The collateral value amounts to zero for one firm that provided security rights, but without assets reported in the annual account. As the bank is actually not secured, the value of Collateral value/secured debt (log) is zero. 25 We obtain significant estimates for both measures if we restrict the sample to firms with secured debt. 26 Critics might argue that the choice of examiner is endogenous. Specifically, judges may appoint auditors for distressed firms with a higher expected likelihood to survive, which could drive our result. We argue that our results are not driven by this possible 'examiner shopping' by judges for two reasons. First, the examiner is appointed at the initiation of the reorganization procedure when information on the rescue prospects is limited and uncertain (see Baird & Morrison on information revelation during court-supervised restructuring, 2001). Second, we find no evidence that distressed firms assisted by an appointed examiner-auditor have higher prebankruptcy profitability (EBITDA/Assets).
not significantly, we find that distressed firms managed by more experienced entrepreneurs have a higher likelihood to succeed in reorganization. More general, this suggests that management experience can be regarded as a proxy for organizational slack. Organizational slack acts as a buffer to protect the firm's core from environmental pressures, and may allow the firm to survive (see e.g. Scharfman et al., 1988) . Bourgeois (1981) defined slack as 'that cushion of actual or potential resources that allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to external environment'.
The variable Management experience includes both past and current positions on boards ever held by members of the distressed firm's board. If the number of positions is restricted to those exercised at the moment of procedure initiation (i.e. past positions are excluded), we have a proxy for the network and business relations of the management of the distressed firm. The variable is defined as Entrepreneurial network. The larger the entrepreneurial network, the more access to resources and financial support (potential slack) 27 , and the more ability to survive. The coefficient estimate of Entrepreneurial network in specification 13 is negative and significant.
The entrepreneurial-related variable Prior bankruptcy is introduced in specification 14 (see also Morrison, 2007) . Our variable Prior bankruptcy counts the earlier bankruptcies in which the board of directors of the distressed firm has been involved as a director
28
. The variable Prior bankruptcy is positive as expected, but insignificant. The dummy variable D-Personal guarantee takes the value of one when the entrepreneur provided a personal guarantee, and zero otherwise, and is equally introduced in specification 14. If entrepreneurs provided a guarantee, they are likely more motivated to survive because their private wealth is on stake. Debt personally guaranteed has the expected negative estimate, and is significant 29 .
27 See Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006) on the existence of an 'internal capital market', whereby subsidiaries benefit from the support by the group it belongs, especially when the firm belongs to the core of the group. 28 If a firm goes bankrupt two years after management dismissal, we consider the dismissed manager responsible and count it as an involvement in a previous bankruptcy. In Belgium, from a legal point of view, replaced managers even remain responsible for three years after their discharge. 29 In unreported analysis (available on demand), we noticed that the distressed firm's age has no effect on the likelihood of failure. We estimate the likelihood of transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage by using a probit model. The binary dependent variable equals one if the firm ends in bankruptcy-liquidation, and zero otherwise. The values in brackets are robust t-statistics based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance; * / **/ *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%. We refer to appendix A for a description of the explanatory variables. The estimates of specification 1 to 14 are based on our sample of 89 small corporations. In specifications 1 and 2 we introduce Government debt/total debt and Secured bank debt/total debt respectively. We control for size by the number of employees. Government debt/total debt does clearly not affect the likelihood of failure, while natural persons that are more reliant on secured bank debt tend to have a lower probability of failure. Unfortunately we cannot verify how collateralization affects the failure rate, because of the data limitations mentioned before. Surprising is the finding that that sole proprietorships with more staff have a higher likelihood to exit the court-supervision stage as a going concern. This is a very robust finding of all specifications in table 7. This may suggest that courts are more lenient towards sole proprietorships with more employees
30
. To verify whether this is driven by local unemployment concerns, we add the unemployment rate of the judicial district during the year of plan confirmation in specification 3. The coefficient is negative as expected, but not significant, and the coefficient estimated for the number of employees remains robustly negative.
In specification 4 we enrich specification 2 with court dummies for the three largest courts in our sample of proprietorships (the courts of Charleroi, Liège and Verviers). For proprietorships judicial discretion is found to play an important role. The coefficient for the court of Charleroi dummy (Dcourt of Charleroi) is significant at the 5 % level, while the coefficient for the court of Liège dummy (D-court of Liège) comes very close to significance. These findings are consistent with the statistics on failure per bankruptcy court reported in table 2. Table 5 shows that the frequency of conversions during the pre-confirmation stage varies widely across courts. If judges chose systematically not to convert cases of unviable firms, they reveal a judicial aversion to filter between viable and unviable firms. In this line of reasoning, we regard the judges of Charleroi and Liège as 'active' screeners because of their high conversion rates. In specification 5 we enrich specification 4 with the Conversion rate during the pre-confirmation stage, while in specification 6 we substitute the conversion rate for the court dummies. The results indicate that the court dummies are not longer significant after the introduction of the conversion rate, and that the conversion rate itself is strongly significant. If courts screen more actively during the preconfirmation stage, failure rates during the post-confirmation stage are lower. In unreported robustness tests we find the coefficient estimated for conversion rate is still significant in a sample without the cases of Charleroi and Liège.
In specification 7 we enrich specification 4 with the examiner variables 31 . We find that more experienced examiners during the pre-confirmation period make for lower failure rates during the post-confirmation period. Note also that the introduction of the examiner variables strongly affect the 30 The number of employees does not affect the likelihood of failure in our sample of small corporations. 31 We do introduce D-auditor because only one auditor was appointed in our sample of 61 sole proprietorships. dummy for the court of Liège, which is consistent with the earlier finding in table 5 that the judges of the court of Liège appoint more experienced examiners (see panel C of table 5). In specification 8 we omit the court dummies and find that both Examiner experience and examiner education have an effect on the likelihood of failure. In unreported robustness checks, we find that the significance of Examiner experience falters in a sample without the cases of Liège, although the sign remains negative 32 . Table 7 : The likelihood of failure during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage for sole proprietorships.
We estimate the likelihood of transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage in our sample of 61 sole proprietorships. We use a probit model with binary dependent variable that equals one if the firm ends in bankruptcy-liquidation, and zero otherwise. The values in brackets are robust t-statistics based on the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance; * / **/ *** significant at 10% / 5% / 1%. We refer to appendix A for a description of the explanatory variables. In sum, more active screening by the judges and the appointment of more experienced examiners in the pre-confirmation stage leads to lower failure rates in the post-confirmation stage, although the latter effect is to some extent driven by the court of Liège. This implies that for proprietorships we cannot reject hypothesis 3 that judicial discretion affects firm failure. In addition we find that proprietorships with more employees are very robustly more likely to survive during the postconfirmation period.
6.
The length of time spent in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation.
The literature argues that the time spent in bankruptcy is a proxy for indirect bankruptcy costs (see e.g. Franks & Torous, 1989; Bris et al., 2006; Morrison, 2007) . Bris et al. (2006) argue that the bankruptcy's adverse impact on product and capital markets increases with the time spent in bankruptcy. Morrison (2007) more specifically refers to the delay in reallocating the distressed firm's assets to a third party who can put them to a better use. Next to indirect costs, direct administrative costs also increase with case duration under bankruptcy. Bankruptcy costs equally increase with the time spent in the Belgian court-supervised post-confirmation stage for firms that ultimately end in bankruptcy-liquidation. In an efficient system, those failing firms should be identified and liquidated as soon as possible to minimize costs. Therefore, we hypothesized that more distressed firms are liquidated faster during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage (hypothesis 1.b). This hypothesis of filtering efficiency is tested using our sample of 44 small failed corporations In specification 1 of table 8 we include accounting variables as determinants of the time spent in the post-confirmation period. We find a positive and significant estimate for profitability (measured as EBITDA scaled by total assets) that turns out to be robust in all specifications: less distressed firms spent more time in the court-supervised post-confirmation stage, while more distressed firms are liquidated faster. This suggests that the system is relatively efficient. The time spent in the preconfirmation stage 35 , leverage and liquidity do not affect the time spent in the post-confirmation period. In specification 2 we control for industry conditions, but none of the industry variables contributes to the explanation. The negative sign for industry sales growth, that turns significant in some specifications, may be driven by higher liquidation values of sector-specific assets because of higher demand in industries with high sales growth, which leads to faster liquidations. We drop leverage and liquidity in further specifications to avoid overspecification in a small sample.
In specification 3 and 4 we add the debt composition variables Government debt/total debt and Secured bank debt/total debt. The positive coefficient of Government debt/total debt suggests that the government is not a very active actor in the filtering process: firms with more government debt linger on for a longer period of time before they are finally liquidated. This is confirmed in specification 5
where we find a significantly positive coefficient for Government debt/total assets variable. The positive coefficient for Secured bank debt/total debt is in line with our previous findings, although not significant, but we stress again that collateralization is a better measure for liquidation value.
In specification 6 we add our measure of collateralization and find an opposite negative coefficient, again in line with our previous findings. In unreported robustness checks the coefficient of Collateral value/ secured bank debt is always found to be negative, while its significance depends on the specification: if collateralization is high, creditor resistance is high, which leads to faster liquidation of unviable firms.
Conclusion.
Unlike Chapter 11 in the U.S., distressed firms in Belgium temporarily remain under court-supervision during plan execution. This court-supervised post-confirmation period takes a period of 24 months in most cases. Using a sample of small firms, we analyze bankruptcy-liquidation during this postconfirmation period and the time spent under it before transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation, by explicitly testing 5 hypotheses.
We find that more distressed firms are more likely to fail during the court-supervised postconfirmation and do so more quickly (hypothesis 1), which indicates that the Belgian procedure may be a relatively effective filter of viable firms.
Secured banks with higher collateral values are more likely to fail (hypothesis 2a), which is not surprising in the Belgian context. In Belgium, judges and unsecured creditors may confirm a plan without the explicit agreement of secured creditors, as is the case in the U.S., leaving the conflict between secured creditors and debtors unresolved. Moreover, and unlike in the U.S., secured creditors always regain their absolute rights 18 months after plan confirmation, if no agreement was reached during the pre-confirmation stage. Therefore, if secured creditors are not fully repaid within those 18 months, they can freely seize and sell assets. This may lead well-collateralized creditors to induce more bankruptcy-liquidation during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage.
We find also that firms with more due government debt have a higher likelihood to fail during the court-supervised post-confirmation period (hypothesis 2b), which is consistent with Canadian findings. This is not unexpected since the Belgian legal rules and reorganization practice require that prioritized government claims are fully repaid during the court-supervised post-confirmation stage.
While judicial discretion does not affect small corporations, it clearly affects the failure of sole proprietorships during the post-confirmation period (hypothesis 3). Specifically, more active screening by the judges and the appointment of more experienced examiners in the pre-confirmation stage leads to lower failure rates in the post-confirmation stage.
Appendix A: variable description.
Description of the variable

Accounting data
Accounting data obtained from the latest annual account prior to petition filing (prebankruptcy information) Profitability Gross operating income (EBITDA) scaled by total assets Leverage Total liabilities/assets Liquidity Quick ratio (current assets -liquidity / current liabilities)
Variables on debt composition
The debt amounts at procedure initiation are reported in the bankruptcy documents Government debt/total debt Government debt scaled by total debt (variable measured at the start of the procedure) Secured debt/total debt Secured bank debt scaled by total debt (variable measured at the start of the procedure) Government debt/total assets Government debt at the start of the procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets Secured bank debt/total assets Secured bank debt at the start of the procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets Trade debt/total assets Trade credit at the start of the procedure scaled by pre-bankruptcy assets Total assets / secured bank debt (log)
Logarithmically transformed ratio of pre-bankruptcy assets scaled by secured bank debt at the start of the procedure (collateral proxy) Collateral value/ secured bank debt (log)
Logarithmically transformed collateral value scaled by secured bank debt at the start of the procedure (detailed collateral proxy A low rate of conversion suggests for a court with on average passive judges, which leave the decision to transfer to bankruptcy-liquidation to the market, i.e. to the debtor or creditors. 
Examiner variables
Controls
Total assets (log) The logarithmic variable of the pre-bankruptcy assets (as reported in the latest annual account prior to petition filing) Industry sales growth
The industry sales growth is the industry average of the annual sales growth over the last three fiscal years before the distressed firm's filing for bankruptcy-reorganization (based on 3-digit Nace codes).
Industry profit margin
The industry profit margin is the operating profit margin for the last fiscal year before the distressed firm's filing for bankruptcy-reorganization (based on 3-digit Nace codes).
Number of employees
The number of employees as reported in the latest annual account prior to petition filing Unemployment rate
The unemployment rate of the judicial district during the year of plan confirmation 37 If a firm goes bankrupt two years after management dismissal, we consider the dismissed manager responsible and count it as an involvement in a previous bankruptcy. Specification 1 is our baseline specification, and specification 2 and 3 respectively add court dummies and variables on judicial discretion. We find a positive and significant estimate for profitability that is very robust in all specifications. Firms with more government debt are liquidated faster, equally as those firms that provided much collateral relative to outstanding bank debt. Judicial discretion and court-driven variables in general do not affect the time to fail. Our findings based on survival analysis are consistent with our previous probit findings of section 5.1.
